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Abstract
We study networks of relations { groups of agents linked by several cooperative relationships
{ exploring equilibrium conditions under dierent network congurations and information struc-
tures. Relationships are the links through which soft information can ow, and the value of a
network lies in its ability to enforce agreements that could not be sustained without the infor-
mation and sanctioning power provided by other network members. The model explains why
network closure is important; why stable subnetworks may inhibit more valuable larger networks;
and why information ows and action choices cannot be analyzed separately. Contagion strategies
are suboptimal here, as they inhibit information transmission, delaying punishments.
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Cooperative relationships sustained by \the shadow of the future" are a fundamental governance
mechanism for most forms of economic and social interaction. When several long-term relationships
link dierent agents in a group, these agents and their relationships form networks of relations. This
paper is a step in the economic analysis of these common social structures with a focus on their
simultaneous and interdependent roles as multilateral enforcement mechanisms and informal com-
munication channels. It denes and studies networks of relations, identies equilibrium conditions
for dierent network architectures and informational regimes, and determines whether there are key
players aecting cooperation within the network.
Like social interactions, economic transactions are often part of a long-term relationship, episodes
in a history of exchanges (Macaulay, 1963; MacLeod, 2007). Economic and social relationships are
embedded in a wider network of other economic and social relationships that may be crucial to
their governance: sociologists have long argued that by ignoring the networks of social relationships in
which economic transactions are \embedded," economists fail to grasp crucial features of the economic
process (Coleman 1988, 1990, Granovetter 1985).1 Multilateral \community enforcement" mechanisms
based on social or ethnic ties have indeed been the main governance instrument in many historical
periods (North 1991, Greif 1993, Dixit 2004). They are still crucial in developing countries where
formal enforcement institutions are weak (McMillan and Woodru 1999), but are also crucial in
advanced economies for complex sectors where contracting is necessarily highly incomplete. In the
fast-changing world of high-tech products, rms often form networks of cooperative agreements to
share the high risks and returns from their activities (Powell et al. 1996). In the nancial industry,
where asymmetric information is pervasive, the interbank market constitutes a fundamental network of
relationships that in normal times allows intermediaries to smoothly exchange liquidity and maximize
nancing (Leitner 2005, Allen and Babus 2009); a network so important that if severed may lead to a
collapse of the nancial system, as experienced during the winter of 2008-2009. Within the Internet,
reciprocal peering agreements between Internet service providers (ISPs) form a network of long-term
cooperative relationships (Shin and Weiss 2004, Lippert and Spagnolo 2008). Of course, cooperation
is not always for the good of society: networks of relations are an obvious governance instrument for
corruption, cartels and many other forms of illegal exchanges (Calv o-Almengol and Zenou 2004).
Model and results. Most of the conicts governed by long-term relationships { from hold-up
situations in exchanges with noncontractible dimensions to opportunistic defaults on loans to cheating
on cartel prices or public-good contributions { have the strategic features of a Prisoners' Dilemma
game. Our basic model is thus a repeated game in which each agent repeatedly interacts in generic,
asymmetric bilateral Prisoners' Dilemma games with a subset of other agents whom he is connected
to. In contrast with most previous work, we interpret cooperative relationships as the links of the
1Granovetter writes: \The embeddedness argument stresses instead the role of concrete personal relations and
structures (or \networks") of such relations in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance" (1995, p. 490). See
Spagnolo (1999a) for a model of embeddedness in the workplace.
2\relational network," as they are the channels ensuring that private information successfully and
truthfully ows from an agent to the others.
In this setup, we rst consider the two benchmark cases of Public Information, where each agent
observes the histories of play of all agents in the network, and Private Information without Communi-
cation, where each agent only observes his own history of play and no information can be exchanged
across agents. Our main focus, however, is on the third { core { case of Word-of-Mouth Communica-
tion (WoM), where agents, while meeting to cooperate/transact, can choose whether to exchange or
pass on observed or received private information on the history of play, and whether to do it truthfully
or lie. In this core case we allow for dierent speeds of information circulation within the network.
This generates a space-time-neighborhood structure for agents in the network that determines the
benet from belonging to it and that appears not to have been tackled before in economics.
Under WoM, we nd that the possibility of transmitting soft information about privately ob-
served defections to other agents in a closed network of relations can indeed be used to sustain it
in equilibrium. We also nd that Multilateral Grim Trigger strategies (MGs), which are optimal (in
the sense of Abreu 1988) in the bilateral repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and under public information
and that correspond to the contagion strategies widely studied in random matching games, are no
longer optimal when we endogenize information transmission by explicitly taking into account the
agent's incentives to communicate truthfully. When cooperation in the network is disciplined by such
strategies, Word-of-Mouth Communication is never used in equilibrium, as an agent that reverts to
noncooperative play forever after observing a defection triggers a contagious process that eliminates
all prospects of future cooperation in the network, thereby removing incentives and possibilities to
truthfully communicate. When forgiving Multilateral Repentance strategies (MRs) are used instead,
such that after a defection, nondefecting agents continue cooperating and spread information on the
deviation until (only) the initial deviator is punished by a neighbor's proting from such punishment,
agents do have incentives to transmit and pass on information truthfully to avoid the collapse of coop-
eration. As information transmission within the network speeds up punishment phases, the forgiving
MRs strictly dominate the contagious MGs.
Another central nding of our analysis is that, with asymmetric underlying games, networks of
relations display a rather general end-network eect that occurs under any informational assumption
and that resembles the end-game eects of nitely repeated games: Network structures such as trees
or stars are never sustainable because agents with only an outgoing link cannot be sanctioned if they
defect. We show that this end-network eect is a special case of gatekeeping and characterize those
gatekeepers as key players to cooperation in the network. Circular networks overcome this problem,
ensuring that all defections can be met with punishment and that networks of relations are sustainable
in equilibrium. These results provide a rigorous and intuitive explanation for the importance of the
\closure" and \density" of social networks as stressed by sociologists like Coleman.2
We then nd that with private information (with or without communication) and MGs, bilater-
2To be precise, Coleman's formulation of closure suggests high density and thus integrates the two concepts that we
treat separately in our model.
3ally enforceable relations between some agents may hinder the stability of larger networks, as these
agents may not be willing to sacrice their bilateral relation to perform their part in the multilateral
punishment mechanism that could sustain the larger network. This argument extends from bilateral
relations to larger sustainable subnetworks and generalizes results from international trade theory
showing that bilateral or regional agreements may undermine multilateral ones by softening third-
party punishments (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger 1997, 1999). However, we also show that this problem
can be overcome by forgiving MRs, which may explain why in reality { where unforgiving MGs are
typically not used { the World Trade Organization trade agreements tend to start from a small group
of countries and then extends to the rest (e.g., Horn and Mavroidis 2001).
Related Literature. Our paper brings together several strands of the economics literature. It
contributes to the recent literature on the emergence and stability of networks as surveyed in Jack-
son (2004, 2008) and Goyal (2007). Most models in this literature focus on agents' decisions about
whether to build and maintain costly links, while the underlying game and enforceability problems
are typically left out of consideration.3 Our approach is orthogonal and complementary: we do not
deal with network formation and evolution, instead digging deeply in terms of microstructure and
the sustainability of cooperation in dierently shaped network structures, allowing for asymmetries,
dierent punishment strategies, and the choice of whether to transmit information truthfully or to
distort or conceal it. Within the networks literature, the studies closest to us are Bloch, Genicot and
Ray (2008), Haag and Laguno (2006) and Vega Redondo (2006).4 Bloch, Genicot and Ray is closest
in that they study bilateral self-enforcing informal insurance agreements in xed network structures
with information owing through the network. As in our paper, they identify bottlenecks as key play-
ers in their insurance networks, those likely to defect from the bilateral insurance schemes because
the threat of multilateral punishment may be insucient for some income realizations.5 Contrary
to our paper, they focus on grim-type strategies and an exogenously given information transmission
technology and thus do not characterize how strategies and information transmission interact. Haag
and Laguno characterize the socially optimal neighborhood structures (network geographies) that
a central planner should choose to maximize cooperation among a group of agents with stochasti-
cally dierent discount factors who interact bilaterally with neighbors in identical and symmetric
innitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games, focusing on multilateral grim trigger type strategies
without communication. Vega Redondo analyzes the dynamic process that leads to the emergence
3In a footnote to their introduction, Belleamme and Bloch (2004) write: \In this paper, our focus is on the stability
of market sharing agreements, and we assume that these agreements are enforceable. The issue of enforceability of
market sharing agreements is an important one, which cannot be answered in traditional models of repeated oligopoly
interaction. We leave it for further study." Our work can be seen as a rst part of this further study.
4Also related are Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2007), in which they address the relationship between coalitional stability
and the value of subgroups, which is closely related to the relationship between self-sustaining subnetworks and the
stability of the network in our paper; and Ali and Miller (in progress), discussed below.
5Ballester, Calv o-Armengol, and Zenou (2006) characterize individual equilibrium behavior in a network for agents
with linear-quadratic interdependent payos. They identify key players to target if a central planner wants to change the
aggregate group outcome of the activity chosen by the individuals in the network as a function of their intercentrality
measures. Formulating the underlying game, we provide an intuition for why there are players who are key to sustaining
the network.
4of equilibrium neighborhood structures for agents playing idiosyncratic symmetric innitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma games with random payos. He assumes grim trigger-type strategies and the
exogenous diusion of information along the network and studies the dynamic process of adaptation
and the search for new cooperation opportunities along the network while the quality of existing co-
operative relations is subject to stochastic depreciation. We are close to these two papers because
we also look at sustainable cooperation within groups of agents playing innitely repeated bilateral
games with neighbors in dierent network structures. We dier considerably, however, both in focus
and because we allow for generic payo structures, that is, both idiosyncratic and asymmetric payos
(payo asymmetry being core to our results without communication), for other than grim trigger-type
strategies, and for endogenous communication and soft information transmission.
Our work is also related to the literature on social norms and \community enforcement" in random
matching games.6 Close studies within this literature are Kandori (1992), which does not limit the
analysis to contagion strategies but also considers the eects of a central information transmission
institution; Harrington (1995), which analyzes a model in which agents play a repeated game on a
network like ours, though without communication; and Ahn and Suominen (2001).7 This latter study
is closest to ours, as it analyzes how WoM between successive buyers helps to enforce a seller's honest
behavior in a random matching environment where agents have private information about part of
the seller's history and can send signals to other agents that help sustain cooperation (seller's honest
behavior). Dierently from our paper, Ahn and Suominen's messages are \public announcements,"
in the sense that they directly and immediately reach the agent who is supposed to act on that
information, that is, the buyer who is in charge in that period. Therefore, relations between agents
and the shape of the network play no role.8
Several other articles model Word-of-Mouth Communication as the ability to observe other agents'
past actions rather than as an agent's deliberate choice of whether to truthfully transmit private
information.9 We, on the other hand, analyze WoM as part of the agents' strategies and show
when agents have incentives to pass on their information truthfully in equilibrium. This is closer
to what Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) do in a classic repeated-games framework with private
monitoring. However, in their paper there is no relational network structure and communication is
public { messages are observed by all players { so that even if there were a network structure, it would
be irrelevant with regard to communication.
Because we model the transmission of information about privately observed histories, our paper
is also relevant to the literature on reputation, which typically assumes either that the reputation
bearer's behavior is publicly observed by potential future partners or that privately observed behavior
is truthfully communicated from one market participant to the others.10 However, recent empirical
6Started by Kandori (1992) and developed, among others, by Ellison (1994), Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995),
and Dixit (2004) which also extended the approach to third-party enforcement.
7See also Balmaceda (2005), for a model where agents rst form costly links and then repeatedly and randomly
interact with other agents. The role of the links is to allow information to ow, and agents are assumed to transmit
information truthfully and only on directly observed history.
8In fact, there are neither relationships nor a shape of the network in their model.
9Among others, Banerjee (1993), Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), or Foster and Rosenzweig (1995).
10See Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for nice surveys of this literature. Fishman
5research on eBay and other electronic platforms shows that such information may often not be trans-
mitted or that it may be distorted, manipulated or even fabricated, pointing to the importance of
explicitly studying agents' incentives to pass on soft information truthfully (Dellarocas 2006).
Finally, our work is related to the theoretical literature on multimarket contact and collusion (e.g.,
Bernheim and Whinston 1990, Spagnolo 1999b) and to its application to self-enforcing international
agreements. The closest paper to ours within these strands of literature is Maggi (1999), which extends
the multimarket contact framework by modeling multilateral self-enforcing international trade agree-
ments, and Belleamme and Bloch (2004), which looks at the stability of market-sharing agreements
as a network. Our paper contributes to these literatures, showing how agents can exploit indirect
multimarket contact to collude/cooperate in generic strategic situations (payo functions, number of
agents and relations) with imperfect information and endogenous information transmission.
We proceed with the denition of a network of relations in section 2. In section 3, we derive re-
sults for sustainable networks in Public Information and Private Information without Communication
environments. We study the eects of introducing the agents' abilities to engage in Word-of-Mouth
Communication in section 4. Section 5 contains a discussion of related research questions and of how
our contribution relates to important concepts in the literature on Social Capital. All proofs are in
the Appendix.
2 Set up
Interaction Let there be a set N = f1;:::;ng of innitely lived agents indexed by i 2 N that
interact in pairs according to a predetermined link structure C of two-element subsets of N; where
ij 2 C; i;j 2 N; if they are linked.11 We assume all agents to be fully cognizant of C.
In each period t, linked agents interact in social dilemmas with the strategic features of Prisoner's




agent i Cij cij;cji lij;wji
Dij wij;lji dij;dji
;
where lij < dij < cij < wij and lij + wij < cij + cji; 8i;j 2 N; i 6= j: Time is discrete, and all agents
share a discount factor  < 1.
Agent i can either cooperate with j, choosing Cij, or she can choose a selsh action Dij. The
generic (asymmetric) Prisoner's Dilemma structure captures the essential strategic features of most
examples discussed in the introduction: one could interpret Cij as Comply with the terms of a
relational supply or labor contract or as Contribute to a local public good, or as Collude in a cartel or
and Rob (2005) present a reputation model where WoM is partly endogenized but truthful by assumption.
11This underlying link structure can be thought of as geographical, such as in the case of farmers cooperating in
water management or blocking soil erosion on the border of their neighboring elds. This underlying geography is not
essential for any of our results { in previous versions of the paper, we did without it { but it appears to facilitate the
understanding of the strategic situation we have in mind.
6in other forms of organized crime. In each of these examples, the Dij could be interpreted as \Don't"
collude, contribute, comply, or cooperate.
Denitions and graphical representation Let  be a strategy prole in the n-player supergame.
Then two linked agents i and j have a relation if and only if they play Cij;Cji in every period on
the realization path in . To simplify the exposition, we will restrict the focus to equilibria with
stationary realization/outcome paths in terms of agents' choice so that two interacting agents either
share a relation and cooperate all the time or do not and never cooperate.12
Let ij denote pairs of agents in N and let R  C denote the set of pairs of agents in N who share
a relation. Let Ri = fjjij 2 Rg be the set of agents with whom agent i shares a relation.
Denote with gij agent i's net expected discounted gains from the relation with agent j in the
2-player supergame (short: i's net gain from cooperating with j), that is, the dierence between the
discounted payo from playing
 
Cij;Cji





gij  ci;j   (1   )wi;j   di;j:
In a standard bilateral repeated game setting, a necessary condition for a cooperative relation to
be sustainable in equilibrium is that both agents have a nonnegative net gain from cooperating with
each other as, in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Friedman's (1971) Grim Trigger (or \unrelenting
Nash reversion") strategies are an optimal punishment in the sense of Abreu (1988).
We call a link between agent i and agent j decient for agent i if and only if i's net gain from
cooperation in ij is strictly negative and nondecient for agent i if and only if i's net gain is non-
negative. The link ij is mutual if and only if both agents i and j have a nonnegative net gain from
cooperation with each other and is unilateral if and only if one of them has a strictly negative and
the other one has a nonnegative net gain. Finally, it is bilaterally decient if and only if both have a
strictly negative net gain from cooperation.
A simple way to represent relations is graphical, where a line or an arrow is drawn between agents
i and j if and only if i and j share a relation. We depict a relation on a link ij that is nondecient
for i by an incoming arrow13 to agent i. A relation on a unilateral link (short: a unilateral relation)
is thus depicted by an arc originating from the agent for whom the link is decient. A relation on a
mutual link (short: a mutual relation) is depicted by an incoming arc to both agents. A relation on
a bilaterally decient link (short: a bilaterally decient relation) is just a line.
We dene a network of relations N S = (N;R) to be one consisting of a set of agents N and a set
of relations R. We call it sustainable if and only if the strategy prole  in the n-player supergame
12We see no reason to believe that our results should not extend to any other less simple and intuitive cooperative
equilibria once they are dened as \relationships."
13Note that our graphical representation of relational networks departs from the conventional graphical representation
in the literature on network formation. There, an arrow going out from a vertex i usually depicts a link sponsored or
formed by vertex i. In our graphical representation, on the other hand, the presence of arrows conveys information on
the sustainability of relations with optimal bilateral punishments, more specically on each agent's net discounted gains
from defecting from a bilateral relation.
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Figure 1: From left: mutual relation, unilateral relation, bilaterally decient relation
prescribing the relations in R constitutes a sequential equilibrium. Note that any mutual relation is
a sustainable network consisting of two nodes and one relation. Finally, we call a sustainable rela-














Figure 2: From left: mutual network, mixed network, nonmutual network
A relational network, N S = (N;R), is mutual if it consists only of mutual relations; it is nonmutual
if it contains no mutual relations; and it is mixed if it consists of both mutual and other relations.
Given N S = (N;R); the number of agents in N is called the order of N S, and the number of
relations in R is called the size of N S: The degree of vertex i is the number of edges of agent i, denoted
degi: An agent of degree 1 is called the end vertex. A network is called an i j path if it consists of a
nite alternating sequence of agents and links that begins with agent i and ends with agent j, in which
each link in the sequence joins the agent that precedes it in the sequence to the agent that follows
in the sequence, in which no agent is repeated. An i   j path is called a cycle if i = j. A relational
network satises the property of closure if each player in the network is part of a cycle. A cycle of
size c is called a c cycle. A disconnecting set of edges is a set F  R such that N S (N;R n F) has
more than one component (connected subgraph of N S that is not contained in any other connected
subgraph of N S).
Information structures We will consider three informational assumptions.
(I1) Public Information: Every agent observes the history of all bilateral Prisoner's Dilemmas.
(I2) Private Information without Communication: Every agent only observes the history of the bi-
lateral Prisoner's Dilemmas he plays, that is, the past actions chosen by his neighbors in their
interactions with him (and not the actions his neighbors chose in their interactions with other
players); and he cannot transmit this information to other agents.
(I3) Word-of-Mouth Communication: (i) Every agent observes only the history of the bilateral Pris-
oner's Dilemmas he plays, as in (I2); (ii) at the end of each period, after the period's actions have
been observed by the players of each respective Prisoner's Dilemma, every agent has the choice
of whether to transmit information on the history of his interactions (including this period's
8actions) to other neighboring agents he shares a relation with and whether to do it truthfully
or to lie; (iii) at the end of each period, every agent also has the choice of whether to pass on
received information to other neighbor agents he shares a relation with and whether to do it
truthfully or to lie. A message can be passed on v  1 times per period; therefore, v denes the
maximum number of nonneighbor agents to which information on a neighbor's choice of action
can be passed on at the beginning of each period in a given environment.
(I1) can be thought of as a situation where an institution processes and distributes information
centrally and without delay, as in Kandori (1992) and Maggi (1999). All agents are immediately
informed about deviations and can adapt their actions in the following period.
(I2), on the other hand, describes the opposite situation: The past actions of neighbors and
nonneighbors with respect to third agents cannot be observed, nor can agents report/communicate
the observed history in their own bilateral interactions to third parties. For example, in Figure 2,
besides knowing which actions she took herself, player 1 observes C21 or D21 and C31 or D31, but
she does not observe nor does she receive information on whether 2 played C23 or D23 and whether
3 played C32 or D32.
(I3), Word-of-Mouth Communication requires a more extended discussion. In (I3), the past
actions of neighbors and nonneighbors with respect to third agents cannot be observed; however, agents
can report/communicate the observed history in their own bilateral interactions to third parties whom
they have relations with, and they can pass on these reports/communications. In (I3), to communicate
private information on neighbors' past actions is a choice. Each agent i can chose to send an agent
j with whom he is cooperating messages of the following kind: \Agent h defected from the network
equilibrium strategies (relationship) against agent k at time t." The message can either be based on
direct observation (then k = i) or be obtained from a partner in another relationship. Agents can
also choose to send false messages or not to pass on truthful or false ones received from others. We
assume that partners can exchange this information only if they meet to cooperate. They only meet
if they cooperate, for example, to help maintain a local common property, and they cannot exchange
information if they choose not to cooperate even if they desire to do so, because there is no meeting
as a result.
Information exchanged is \soft," in the sense that the truthfulness of sent messages cannot be
veried by partners or third parties. It is therefore possible, either on purpose or erroneously, for each
agent to falsely state that the rst known defector was k, even though it was j (a partner may not
have told the truth about a previous defection). We assume that agents lie only if they strictly prefer
to do so. We will show that under this natural assumption with Multilateral Repentance strategies
(dened below) agents will choose to truthfully transmit information in equilibrium.
Messages can travel v  1 relationships per period. Therefore, for example, in a linear network
with seven agents and the six relations f12;23;34;45;56;67g when v = 2, the actions of agent 1 in
period  are known to agent 2 and can be transmitted to agents 3 and 4 before they choose their
actions in  + 1; can be passed on to agents 5 and 6 before they choose their actions in  + 2; and
transmitted to agent 7 before she chooses her action in  + 3. If v = 3, then agents 3, 4 and 5 can
9be informed by agent 2 before they choose their actions in  +1, and agents 6 and 7 can be informed
before they choose their actions in  + 2.
3 Public Information and Private Information without Com-
munication
For the two types of multilateral punishment strategies, we will study under which conditions dif-
ferent types of relational networks are sustainable, if any. We will do so in this section for the rst
benchmark case, Public Information (I1), and for the second benchmark, Private Information with-
out Communication (I2). In the next section, we will focus on the core information structure of this
paper, Word-of-Mouth Communication (I3). Before giving results specic to information structures,
we will rst give some general insights on the forces at play in networks of relations.
3.1 End-network eect, gatekeepers, and closure
A straightforward generalization of the sustainability condition for a bilateral relational contract is
that for each agent in the network, the net gain from cooperating with other network members has
to be nonnegative. Furthermore, if cooperation is to be sustained with multilateral strategies, it is
necessary to condition the strategies of each designated punisher on the actions of the relative defector,
either through direct observation, through contagion, or through truthfully transmitted information.
This leads to the following rst observation.
Proposition 1 (End-network eect and Gatekeeping) (i) There exists no sustainable network
of relations that contains an agent with only decient relations.
(ii) Under I2 and I3 (private information with or without communication) there exists no sustain-
able network of relations containing an agent without whose relations the network would have two or
more disjoint connected subnetworks and who faces negative net gains from cooperation in all of his
relations with agents in at least one of these subnetworks.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 gives rise to the mentioned \end-network eect": As long as none of its
relations is mutual, a network with end-vertices is not sustainable because there will always be at
least an agent with negative net gains from cooperation who will defect. Figure 3 illustrates this for a
simple linear network: Agent 1 always has an incentive to deviate. This end-network eect is dierent
but brings to mind the so-called \end-game eect" of nitely repeated games and is similarly general.
An example is given in Figure 3.
12 12 3 3
Figure 3: This network is not sustainable.
10Part (ii) of Proposition 1 gives rise to a gatekeeping eect. Consider the network in Figure 4 (a).
There is a disconnecting set of relations of agent 1, his relations with 2 and 4, for which g12 < 0 and
g14 < 0. The only way to discipline 1 in these relations would be by retaliation in his relation with 5,
but without public information, 5 cannot be aware of a deviation by 1. It is therefore impossible to
construct a strategy that relies on punishment from a nonconnected part of the network.
Figure 4: Gatekeeping
One important way to ensure that a nonmutual network is sustainable is to close the network. To
capture the eect of closure in our model (i.e., that each player in the network is part of a cycle), let us
dene the network version of Friedman's (1971) \Grim Trigger" strategies, the mentioned \Multilateral
Grim Trigger" strategies (MGs), which correspond to the \contagion strategies" introduced by Kandori
(1992) in random matching games. Under dierent informational assumptions, MGs dier slightly, so
they will be denoted by (S1) for Public Information (I1) and by (S2) for Private Information without
Communication (I2).
Strategy prole (S1): Every agent i 2 N S
1. starts playing Cij 8j 2 Ri,
2. continues playing Cij 8j 2 Ri as long as he observes Cmn 8m;n 2 N S, and
3. reverts to Dij 8j 2 Ri forever otherwise.
Strategy and belief prole (S2): Every agent i 2 N S
1. starts playing Cij 8j 2 Ri ,
2. believes that every agent played C with all neighbors and goes on playing Cij 8j 2 Ri as
long as he observes
 
Cij;Cji
8j 2 Ri and
3. if a (optimal or suboptimal) defection is observed, forms a consistent belief about the
history of play and reverts to Dij 8j 2 Ri forever.
In (S1), agents choose the cooperative action (C) with every neighbor in the network at the
beginning of the game and continue doing so as long as everybody in the network has always chosen the
cooperative action in the history of the game. They choose the noncooperative action (D) forever after
one agent in the network has chosen the noncooperative action. In (S2), agents choose the cooperative
action (C) with each of their neighbors in the beginning of the game. As long as throughout the history
11of the game (i) they always chose the cooperative action with each of their neighbors and (ii) each of
their neighbors has always chosen the cooperative action with regard to them, they believe that every
agent in the network has done so and continue to choose the cooperative action. As soon as they
observe that an agent has chosen the noncooperative action (D), they form consistent beliefs on the
history of the game and choose the noncooperative action with all of their neighbors forever after.14
Using these strategies we obtain the following.
Proposition 2 (Closure) A closed network of relations is sustainable
1. under (I1) if and only if, for each agent in the network, the sum of net gains from cooperation
in all his relations is nonnegative: 8i 2 N S,
P
j2Ri gij  0;
2. under (I2) if and only if:
(a) for each agent in the network, the sum of net gains from cooperation is positive: Denoting
the shortest path from an agent in a set of agents Ji to agent k that does not pass through




k2Ri;k= 2Ji l(Ji;k)gik  0; and
(b) beliefs are such that after any observed deviation, the immediate playing of the noncooper-
ative action with every neighbor is sequentially rational.
Part 1 of this result implies that with closure, MGs can sustain relational networks that do not
contain any relation that is bilaterally sustainable in the absence of a network, as in Figure 5 (a). Part
2 requires, for example, for a nonmutual cycle of length c, where 8i, gi;i+1 < 0 and gi;i 1  0, that
8i 2 N S; c 2gi;i 1 + gi;i+1  0.15 Community enforcement makes relations sustainable that would
not be so bilaterally. However, community enforcement relies on each agent's willingness to punish.
With MGs, this entails giving up cooperation with all neighbors forever. To see what is required in
terms of beliefs under (I2), consider the following two examples:
Example 1 Consider an increase in the cooperation payo c12 in Figure 5 (a), so that the relation
12 becomes mutual as in Figure 5 (b). Because 12 is a mutual relation, agent 1 would want to enter a
punishment phase with 2 as late as possible. He will only immediately enter into a punishment phase
with 2 if he believes that 2 enters the punishment phase with a high probability, which is the case if 2
is the original defecting agent (and deviated sub-optimally) or if 2 enters the punishment phase in the
period thereafter, which is the case if 3 is the original defector (and deviated optimally).
Example 2 Assume that player 1 in Figure 5 (a) observes D21 and C61. Then, (S2) requires player 1
to play D16, thus giving up a nondecient relation, and D12 from the next period on. Again, giving up
the nondecient relation is sequentially rational only if player 1 assigns a suciently high probability
14Note that in a sustainable network, there is no information for why any agent should have been the rst to deviate.
Therefore, any belief, for example, the belief that everybody who has not been observed played the noncooperative
action in the last period, is consistent.
15We give more examples for these sustainability conditions and compare them with those with Word-of-Mouth
Communication in section 4.2 below.
12that 2 will enter the punishment phase within the next two periods. These beliefs imply that either



















Figure 5: Nonmutual network on a 6-cycle (a) and mixed network on a 6-cycle (b).
In both examples, beliefs are consistent. However, they can imply suboptimal deviations or several
deviations from the equilibrium path. The restrictions on beliefs necessary to sustain an equilibrium
are more stringent for agents who are part of a higher number of sustainable subnetworks. Agents
who benet (too) strongly from relations with everyone they are connected to can hurt cooperation
between other agents because they could be unwilling to do their part in a multilateral punishment
phase. A consistent belief of agent i that makes it rational for i to enter into Nash reversion with all
neighbors is that, in the period of an observed deviation by one or more of his neighbors, all actions
in the network that i cannot observe were noncooperative actions D.
With public information, every agent observes the complete history of the network in every period.
This leads to a destabilizing eect of subnetworks that are sustainable in the absence of the rest of
the network.
Proposition 3 (Destabilizing subnetworks) Under (I1), if a relational network is sustained by
MGs and can be divided into subnetworks that could be sustained without the rest of the network and
a subnetwork that could not, then it is not strategically stable.
The intuition for this result is that by suboptimally deviating only in the part of the network that
is not sustainable without the rest, a member of the sustainable subnetwork may \send a message"
to the other agents in the sustainable subnetwork indicating that he wants to go on cooperating in
that part of the network. This indication may lead the agents in the sustainable subnetwork not
to implement the costly punishment phase. Again, agents who benet (too) strongly from relations
with everyone they are connected to can hurt cooperation between other agents because they could
be unwilling to do their part in a multilateral punishment phase.
4 Word-of-Mouth Communication
Let us now turn to the central informational assumption of this paper, Word-of-Mouth Communication
(I3), already dened, which allows agents that sustain a relation to communicate and transmit their
private information if they so choose. It is worth noting at the outset that because agents have the
13option to lie, transmitted messages under (I3) are valuable only if all transmitters in the chain have
no incentive to lie or conceal information. Indeed, agents would be better o lying if, after a deviation
of one of their neighbors, the multilateral mechanism would not provide enough incentives for the
agents to go on cooperating with the other neighbors.
4.1 Word-of-Mouth Communication and Multilateral Grim Trigger
Before discussing equilibria that make use of information transmission, we rst note that agents can
always decide not to transmit/pass on information. Indeed, if agents adopt Multilateral Grim Trigger
strategies, Word-of-Mouth Communication will not be used in equilibrium. We can state the following:
Proposition 4 (WoM with MGs) If agents adopt MGs, then agents do not make use of Word-of-
Mouth Communication, and all of the results obtained under (I2) apply unchanged under (I3):
Entering a punishment phase under MGs implies a permanent breakdown of the network. There-
fore, every agent who observes a defection of a neighbor and transmits this information to another
neighbor will deprive himself of the benets from defecting in his other relations without the prospect
of future cooperation. Therefore, information is not transmitted, and a social network is sustainable
under the conditions of Proposition 2, part 2.
4.2 Word-of-Mouth Communication and Multilateral Repentance
In this subsection, we will construct equilibria that use communication. A crucial role will be played by
noncontagious Multilateral Repentance strategies (MRs), which are formally dened below. MRs are
an adaptation of the repentance strategies discussed by van Damme (1989) for the standard bilateral
innitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In that setting repentance strategies are optimal punishment
strategies, as are grim trigger strategies. We will show that under WoM, in equilibria relying on MRs,
information is passed on truthfully through the network, there are no dangerous subnetworks, and
networks are sustainable at lower discount factors than with MGs, implying that if WoM is available
in networks of relations, MGs are not optimal punishment strategies.
Multilateral Repentance strategies (MRs) 1. Each agent i starts by playing Cij 8j 2 Ri.
2. Each agent i goes on playing Cij 8j 2 Ri as long as he does not observe Dji for any j 2 Ri
and as long as he does not receive a message containing Djn for some j 2 Ri:
3. If agent i observes Dji for any j 2 Ri and received no message about an earlier defection
by j, she
(a) sends a message about the deviation to her other neighbors and goes on playing C with
them,




(c) sends her other neighbors a message about the end of the punishment phase for agent
j, and
14(d) goes back to 2. thereafter.
4. If a neighbor k of j receives a message about j's initial deviation, she
(a) plays Dkj until she receives the message that Dij;Cji has been played for Tji periods
and until Dkj;Cjk has been played for Tjk periods, and
(b) returns to 2. thereafter.
5. If agent j played Dji, she
(a) plays Cji for the next Tji periods, Djk in the period when k receives the information
on her initial deviation and Cjk for the next Tjk periods, and
(b) returns to 2. thereafter.
6. Each agent truthfully passes on the messages.
7. If some agent deviates from the actions in 3. { 5., punishment commences against this
agent.
Under MRs, every player who is part of the network of relations starts cooperating with every
neighbor in the network and continues to do so as long as no deviation is observed or reported. If
a player i observes a deviation from neighbor j in the network, he sends a message describing the
deviation to his other neighbors and goes on playing cooperatively with them, while players i and j play
Defect (Dij) and Cooperate (Cji), respectively, for a specied number of periods. Thereafter, i sends a
message about the completion of the punishment of j to other network neighbors and resumes playing
cooperatively with j. If another neighbor k of j receives the message about j0s defection, players k
and j start playing Defect (Dkj) and Cooperate (Cjk), respectively, for a specied number of periods.
After that period and after having received a message from the original sender of the message, i, about
the completion of his punishment by i, k also goes back to cooperation and sends the message that his
part of the punishment was also completed. Finally, deviants from this punishment phase are subject
to the same punishment as the rst defecting agent j.
Note that forgiving MRs are natural punishment strategies in this setting. Strategies targeted to
punish only the guilty agent generally cannot last forever, as an innocent agent defecting for a long
time against a defecting guilty agent would lose incentives to cooperate with other neighbors.16
We can now state the following.
Lemma 1 With Word-of-Mouth Communication and MRs no player has an incentive to conceal
truthful information or pass on false information.
The intuition for this result is that with MRs, transmitting messages only aects the payos of
other agents and, as a result, no agent has an incentive to transmit false information. Given that
truthful information is passed on, MRs make use of the network's ability to implement the targeted
punishment of cheaters. We will now show that Multilateral Repentance strategies, when combined
16We are grateful to David Miller for pointing this out.
15with Word-of-Mouth Communication { that is, the passing on of soft information { (1) are superior
to Private Information without Communication, (2) do not entail dangerous subnetworks, and (3)
constitute optimal punishment strategies.
Proposition 5 (Optimal Punishments with WoM) Under Word-of-Mouth Communication, MRs
are optimal punishment strategies in networks with closure, whereas MGs are not.
The intuition behind this result is that the delay of the punishment can be reduced compared with
MGs. Given that the expected payo stream when the punishment starts for a defector minimaxes the
defector both under MRs and MGs, punishment under MRs is both as strong and as fast as possible.
Therefore, under (I3) MRs constitute optimal punishment strategies in our network, while MGs do
not.
Note that sustainable subnetworks do not aect the sustainability or the strategic stability of the
network. There are two reasons for this. First, as reliable word-of-mouth communication informs
players about the relevant part of the history of play in the network, entering a punishment phase
does not hinge on beliefs. Second, because agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor,
they always have an incentive to do so during a punishment phase even if they want to cooperate
within a sustainable subnetwork.
Proposition 6 (Sustainable Subnetworks with MRs and WoM) With Word-of-Mouth Com-
munication and MRs, sustainable subnetworks do not aect the sustainability or the strategic stability
of a larger network containing them.
MRs also imply that, if information about past actions can be transmitted, it is not necessary to
have a complete and indenite breakdown of cooperation in the network in the case of a deviation.
The equilibrium is consequently more robust (against, for example, mistakes or trembles), and it
increases welfare during punishment phases as compared with equilibria relying on MGs.
Compare sustainability conditions for dierent network structures.
Example 3 Consider rst complete networks of relations where each player shares a relation with
each other player. With MGs (or without WoM), contagion implies community punishment that begins
only one period later. Therefore, any deviation of an agent i vis- a-vis agents k 2 Ri in period t triggers
punishment by agents k starting in period t + 1 and by agents m 2 Ri n k in period t + 2. Therefore,
each player i's optimal deviation is to play Dik with all neighbors k 2 Ri for which gik < 0 and Cim
with all neighbors m 2 Ri n k in t and Dim in period t + 1. The reason is that for m 2 Ri n k,
gik > 0 , c (1   ) d > 0 , c+w > w +d. Denote the set of neighbors k of agent i for which
gik < 0 with R
 
i , and denote the set of neighbors m of agent i for which gim  0 with R
+
i . Then, for










gim  0 8i 2 N S:
16Under WoM and MRs instead any deviation of an agent i in period t is punished by all neighbors of
i from period t + 1 onward. Therefore, a player's optimal deviation is to play D with all neighbors in
the same period. Therefore, MRs constitute a sequential equilibrium as long as
X
j2Ri
gij  0 8i 2 N S:
Therefore, MRs implement cooperation for a larger set of discount factors than MGs.
Example 4 Consider now a nonmutual cycle of length c, where 8i, gi;i+1 < 0 and gi;i 1  0. Then
with MGs (or without WoM) the sustainability condition for agent i is
c 2gi;i 1 + gi;i+1  0 8i 2 N S:








, with MRs and WoM the sustainability condition is instead
(c;v)gi;i 1 + gi;i+1  0 8i 2 N S:
Since (c;v) < c   2 for any v, MRs implement cooperation for a larger set of discount factors than
MGs.
Example 5 Consider a cycle of six agents as in Figure 5(a). Add a relation between agents 6 and 3.
Then the sustainability conditions with MG strategies are
g6;1 + 2g6;3 + 4g6;5  0;
g3;4 + 2g3;6 + 4g3;2  0; and
gi;i+1 + 2gi;i 1  0 8i 2 f1;2;4;5g:
Furthermore, if any of the subnetworks are sustainable without the rest of the network, entering a
punishment phase requires breaking a sustainable subnetwork. Beliefs have to be such that this is
rational. In the same network, assume again MRs, WoM and v = 2. Therefore, the sustainability
conditions are
g6;1 + g6;3 + g6;5  0;
g3;4 + g3;6 + g3;2  0; and
gi;i+1 + gi;i 1  0 8i 2 f1;2;4;5g:
Again, MRs implement cooperation for a larger set of discount factors than MGs. Furthermore,
repentance ensures that even if some subnetworks are sustainable, all players have the incentives to
carry out punishments and transmit information truthfully.
The extent to which MRs are better than MGs can be measured by the set of discount factors for
which a given network, which is sustainable with MRs, is not sustainable with MGs. The size of this
set is a function of the length of paths between any two neighbors of any given agent that do not go
17through that agent17 as well as the speed of information transmission. With increases in the network's
density { the ratio of the number of adjacencies that are present divided by the number of pairs of
actors { these paths shorten. Shortening these paths has two eects on the set of discount factors for
which a given network, which is sustainable with MRs, is not sustainable with MGs. First, each unit
of saved delay becomes less important because the time it takes for third-party punishment to arrive
increases as the network becomes less dense. Second, for large values of v, as the paths lengthen,
the dierence in the delay with which community punishment sets in with MRs and MGs increases.
These two eects work in opposite directions, and the net eect depends on v.
Proposition 7 (Impact of network density) For any given density, there exists a v such that
1. for v < v, as the network becomes denser, the set of discount factors for which a given network
that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with MGs increases; and
2. for v > v, as the network becomes denser, the set of discount factors for which a given network
that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with MGs decreases.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Other questions At this point, one could also ask other questions, such as what is the top Pareto
equilibrium or the largest network of relations that can be sustained in a given exogenous connection
structure, C, as is done in a dierent environment by Haag and Laguno (2006). We believe that
our model as it stands is not well-suited to ask these other questions both because it is too general
(Prisoner's Dilemma payos are idiosyncratic and generic/asymmetric across players and interactions)
and because it does not incorporate a cost of sustaining relations to balance their benets so that a
more cohesive structure with maximal connection tends to be optimal by denition, at least under
the most important and novel assumptions of MRs and WoM. More links and a denser network of
relations speed up punishments besides increasing payos; as a result, the greater number of relations
that can be sustained leads to more intense cooperation that can be sustained in each relation. The
only constraint is the discount factor (besides coordination). Recent work (e.g., Ali and Miller, in
progress) focuses on these other questions in a similar but simpler environment relative to relations
{ they assume symmetric payos, contagion, and no communication { which is also enriched by the
introduction of costs of establishing and maintaining each link and by a network formation stage
preceding the cooperation phase. We therefore leave these other questions to their (and others')
future research.
Full cognizance of the game structure We have assumed that all players are fully cognizant
of the game structure. This includes full cognizance of the set of players, N, of the links in the
underlying connection structure, C, of the players who are part of a multilateral agreement that forms
17For example, in Figure 5 (a), the path between the two neighbors of agent 1 that does not go through agent 1 has
a length of 4.
18the relational network, and of the payos of those players. Reliable Word-of-Mouth Communication
(and a limited number of agents) should enable each agent to get to know over time which agents are
cooperating and which are not and thus make it possible to lift the assumptions of full cognizance.
Following this line of research would imply answering the question of how cooperation comes into
existence. Because the main questions in this essay are how much cooperation is possible within
a relational network under dierent strategies and information regimes and what the best way of
enforcing cooperation for each of them is, this would imply a considerable shift in focus, which is not
within the scope of this paper.18 We therefore leave this to future research.
Social capital The model provides a micro-foundation for Granovetter's (1985) idea of \embed-
dedness," while the \end-network eect" provides a clear explanation for why the \closure" of social
networks is so important for social capital, as argued by Coleman (1988) and (1990). Immediate
applications of our framework include the organization of interrm relations in industrial districts,
the enforcement of collusive behavior in business networks, interbank relations and the eects of \so-
cial capital" on the governance of economic and social interactions. In her widely acclaimed book,
Saxenian (1994) attributes a large part of Silicon Valley's success to a special culture of cooperation
in that industrial district stemming from a common background of the early workforce in that area.
We believe that our model oers a complementary explanation for how social networks may facilitate
information circulation in a community.
In our model, networks of relations generate \slack enforcement power" for some agents, and
we have shown how this allows them to sustain cooperation in additional decient relations, in-
cluding one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. This use of networks of relations as cooperation-
enforcement/governance devices for new social dilemmas can be interpreted as a game-theoretic def-
inition of social capital very close to that proposed by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1990).19 In
particular, our model allows the denition of this individual social capital as follows: \The individual
social capital agents i and k can draw on by being part of a social network is the slack enforcement
18In their contributions to inductive game theory, Kaneko and Matsui (1999) and Kaneko and Kline (2008) model
games where players are not at all cognizant of the game structure. Inductive game theory consists of four stages (see
Kaneko and Mitra, 2009): \(i) experimentation and transformation of short-term memories into long-term memories;
(ii) inductive derivation of a personal view from the long-term memories; (iii) use of a personal view for his own decision
making; and (iv) bringing his decision from (iii) back to (i)." Using their approach would not likely lead to signicant
new results addressing the main questions of this paper. It would, however, complicate the analysis signicantly. For
this reason, we choose not to follow this approach.
19For example, Bourdieu writes: \Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked
to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition
or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-
owned capital, a credential which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. [...] The volume of the social
capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can eectively mobilize
and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom
he is connected," whereas Coleman's denition is less precise but, as does Bourdieu's, characterizes social capital as an
attribute of individuals: \Social capital is dened by its function. It is not a single entity, but a variety of dierent
entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate
certain actions of individuals who are within that structure. [...] Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres the
structure of relations between persons and among persons. It is lodged neither in individuals nor in physical implements
of production." [Our Italics] Both represent micro-perspectives on social capital.
19power of the network available to enforce cooperation-compliance in other interactions in need of gov-
ernance." With complete information, this is only an agent-pair-specic denition. For any agent, the
sum of his net gains from cooperation in all his social relations determines the social capital available
to enforce cooperation in one-shot interactions with other agents. Instead, for the other informational
regimes, the extent to which existing relations in a social network can facilitate \the achievement of
certain ends" for an agent does not depend only on his net gains from cooperation, that is, how much
he has to lose in his social relations.
Because the delay with which an eventual punishment sets in matters, it also depends on partners'
locations in the network. Reviewing \(game-)theoretical questions stimulated by a reection on social
capital," Sobel (2002) identies two ways in which Coleman's (1990) network closure or { put dier-
ently { \dense social networks make enforcement of group cooperative behavior more eective." This
is accomplished rst by creating \common knowledge of information" and second by increasing \the
quality and reliability of third-party monitoring needed to enforce cooperative dynamic equilibria."
In this paper, we oer an additional explanation for why closure is important for the enforcement of
cooperative behavior, namely, the pooling of payo asymmetries.
For Robert Putnam (1995), social capital \refers to the collective value of all `social networks'
and the inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other." Taking this macro-
perspective on social capital, one can also dene aggregate social capital in a sustainable social network
as the average individual social capital in that society. Our model thus also connects the two main
measures of social capital used in empirical studies: the expectation of cooperative outcomes in (one-
shot) collective action problems, or Trust (as in Knack and Keefer 1997, or La Porta et al. 1997),
and the social structure that can lead to it, Social Networks (as in Narayan and Pritchett 1999 or
Temple and Johnson 1998). Our model also highlights that it is the collective norm to enforce business
cooperation in the social sphere, which generates trust and which allows social networks to serve as
a proxy for social capital, that is, as in Lin (2001), to measure the return to social networks in the
business sphere.
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24APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Part 1: Immediate. Part 2: Denote the set of neighbors k of agent i for which gik < 0 with R
 
i
and the set of neighbors m of agent i for which gim  0 with R
+
i . Cooperation in relations of an agent
i with agents m 2 R
 
i have to be enforced by a retaliation threat from agents in m 2 R
+
i . Let Fi be
a set of relations of agent i with neighbors k 2 R
 
i such that N S (N;R n Fi) is a disconnected graph.
Because Fi is a disconnecting set of relations of agent i, if there is no public information, actions in
the other relations of i cannot be a function of the history of i's interactions in Fi. Therefore, agent
i does not have to fear retaliation in his other relations for deviating from relations in Fi.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Part (1): Immediate. Part (2): Suciency: Consider an optimal deviation from (S2). This
deviation will not be protable if the sum of the net gains from cooperation, corrected for the delay of
indirect punishment by contagion, is positive. Furthermore, assumptions regarding the beliefs make
the immediate playing of the noncooperative action with every neighbor rational. Necessity: During
the innite punishment phase, agents play their minmax strategy. This is the strongest punishment
available. As there is no possibility of transmitting information on past behavior, it is also not possible
to enter a punishment phase with a cheater at an earlier time. For these two reasons, (S2) are optimal
punishments, which shows necessity.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Divide network N S into subnetworks A and B so that A is sustainable by MG strategies on
its own and B is not. As a result, there are three equilibria: cooperation in N S, cooperation only
in A, and no cooperation. Furthermore, there exists an agent i who is an element in A and B and
who has negative net gains from cooperation with his neighbors in B. Suppose a history such that
in period , agent i deviated only from his relation(s) in B but not from those with neighbors in A.
In period  + 1, all agents j 2 N S would have to revert to the noncooperative action vis- a-vis all
of their neighbors, including those in the sustainable subnetwork A; and i would have been better
o also deviating from his neighbors in A. Therefore, agent i's suboptimal deviation only from his
relation(s) in B would be rationalizable only if it led to a continuation equilibrium that prescribes
cooperation in A. Therefore, restricting attention to rationalizable strategies in every subgame gives
i the opportunity to implement cooperation in A by deviating only in B, and, for i, cooperating in A
and B is dominated by cooperating with neighbors in A and deviating with neighbors in B.
25D Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. First, if a neighbor played C, passing on a message saying D, it will have the eect that
this neighbor's neighbors will enter into a punishment phase with the neighbor (who will continue
cooperating with the liar). The liar does not gain. Second, if instead a neighbor played D, passing
on a message saying C will delay the punishment for that neighbor on the other side but not aect
the liar's payo (it is not possible to extend the punishment phase for oneself, as this would mean
opening a punishment phase against oneself). The liar does not gain. Third, changing a message that
a neighbor's neighbor played C into D will have the eect that the neighbor's neighbors will enter
into a punishment phase with the neighbor who will go on cooperating with his neighbor. The liar
does not gain. Finally, changing a message that a neighbor played D into C will again delay the
punishment for the cheater but will not aect the liar's payo.
E Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The following constraints have to hold in equilibrium. First, no agent can have an incentive
to deviate in a cooperation phase; denote this constraint by
 
ICCI
. Second, noncheaters must not
have an incentive to deviate in a punishment phase, which entails (a) that they continue to cooperate




(b) that they punish cheaters; denote this constraint by
 
ICP
. Third, cheaters must not have
an incentive to deviate in a punishment phase; denote this constraint by
 
ICLP






: if the noncheater in a punishment phase is a neighbor of a cheater and a neighbor
to noncheaters, continuation payos are the same in relations with noncheaters as in a cooperation








that for each neighbor j of each agent i, the maximum length of the repentance is such that the
continuation payo for the cheater equals the innite stream of her minmax payo in that interaction.
Let i;k 2 Rj and denote Lik the length of the shortest path from i to k that does not go through j.
Given the closure of the network and word-of-mouth communication, actions of agent i 2 Rj in his
interaction with j in period  can be a function of the actions j took vis- a-vis any neighbor k 2 Rj
in periods t     Lik
v   1. With the use of word-of-mouth communication, this delay is as short as
possible. Given that punishment is as strong as possible and comes as early as possible, MR strategies
are optimal punishment strategies.
Because there is no information transmission with MGs, actions of agent i 2 Rj in his interaction
with j in period  can only be a function of the actions j took vis- a-vis any neighbor k 2 Rj in periods
t     Lik. Therefore, the minimum discount factor necessary to sustain a given relational network
with word-of-mouth communication and MR strategies, (S3), is strictly less than the minimum dis-
count factor necessary to sustain the same relational network under MG strategies, (S2). This implies
that MG strategies, (S2), are not optimal punishment strategies.
26F Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Agents are being rewarded for punishing their neighbor. Therefore, they always have an
incentive to carry out a punishment during a punishment phase, even if they are able to cooperate
within a sustainable subnetwork.
G Proof of Proposition 7
Proof.
Denoting the shortest path from an agent in a set of agents Ji to agent k that does not pass through i




k2Ri;k= 2Ji l(Ji;k)gik  0,




k2Ri;k= 2Ji (l(Ji;k)+2;v)gik  0.
Dene MG to be the minimum discount factor for which a given network is sustainable with






MG gik = 0. Ceteris
paribus, increase the delay in punishment by agent k against agent i's defection from j. Then, using the














> 0. Dene MR








































2 < 0, we know that dMR
dl(Ji;k) > dMG
dl(Ji;k) > 0.
Therefore, for a low speed of information transmission, the set of discount factors for which a given
network that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with MGs is decreasing in l. Assume v ! 1.
Then dMR
dl(Ji;k) ! 0, whereas dMG
dl(Ji;k) > 0. Therefore, for a high speed of information transmission, the
set of discount factors for which a given network that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with
MGs is increasing in l.
Therefore, for a given density of a network, there exists a v such that, for v < v, the set of
discount factors for which a given network that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with MGs
is increasing in the network's density and, for v > v, the set of discount factors for which a given
network that is sustainable with MRs is not sustainable with MGs is decreasing in the network's
density.
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